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This research report presents a novel method of dual-tasking lie-detection. Novel
software “Follow Me” was invented for a concurrent eye-hand coordination task during
truth-telling/lying. Undergraduate participants were instructed to tell truths on questions
about undergraduate school whereas they were instructed to tell lies on interview
questions about graduate school, pretending they were graduate students. Throughout
the experiment, they operated the “Follow Me” software: moving the mouse pointer
to follow a randomly-moving dot on a computer screen. The distance between the
mouse pointer tip and the dot center was measured by the software every 50ms.
Frequency of distance fluctuation was analyzed as the index of cognitive effort consumed
per second (i.e., “degree of cognitive effort”). The results revealed that the dominant
frequency of distance fluctuation was significantly lower during encoding than during
retrieving responses; and lower during lying than truth-telling. Thus, dominant frequency
of distance fluctuation may be an effective index of cognitive effort. Moreover, both
encoding and retrieving bald-faced lies were more cognitively effortful than truth-telling.
This novel definition and measurement of degree of cognitive effort may contribute to the
research field of deception as well as to many other fields in social cognition.
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Introduction
Lying is a daily routine for everybody (Bond and DePaulo, 2006) and could incur significant
harm for society. Thus, lie-detection is necessary and critical in multiple contexts, such
as employment screening, insurance claims, and police interrogation. However, detecting
lies via observing behavioral cues is usually difficult (Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Bond and
Depaulo, 2008). Recent studies demonstrated that deception detection may be improved
if diagnostically useful questioning is employed (Levine et al., 2014a), especially if the
interrogators are experts who are familiar with the context of deception (Levine et al.,
2014b). However, diagnostic interrogation is not possible in many contexts, e.g., when
diagnostic interrogation is offensive. Thus, a valid and accurate measure that could help
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identify liars or fabricated accounts directly in these contexts is
desirable. However, there is no lie-specific physiological activity
that can be unambiguously linked to lies (Lykken, 1998). Thus,
some researchers focus on the psychological activity inherent to
lying.
Based on theories that lying is cognitively demanding and
people are inferior at multi-tasking (Pashler, 1994; Logan and
Gordon, 2001), researchers have proposed that lie-detection can
benefit from the manipulation of cognitive load. For example,
observers were more successful at identifying liars when they
were telling a lie in a chronologically reverse order, which
occupied more cognitive resources than telling the same lie in
chronological order (Vrij et al., 2008). Lying often involves more
cognitive operations and a higher cognitive workload than does
truth-telling (Johnson et al., 2003, 2008; Walczyk et al., 2003; Hu
et al., 2011, 2013; Debey et al., 2012), although there were some
exceptions for repeated lies (Hu et al., 2012; Van Bockstaele et al.,
2012).
In spite of these promising results, a study on university
students’ diaries revealed that lying in everyday life is usually
casual (“zero consequence”), difficult to discern, and evokes little
cognitive effort (DePaulo et al., 1996). In fact, some researchers
believe that lying is prevalent in everyday life because lying is
less cognitively effortful than truth-telling in many situations
(McCornack et al., 2014).
This dispute may be due to the potential variance in definition
of “cognitive effort.” Therefore, we define “cognitive effort”
as the cognitive resource consumed per unit time, instead of
the total cognitive resource consumed over the whole time of
truth-telling/lying. It is true that lying could be less effortful
than truth-telling, and thus people often lie in order to save
the total cognitive resources that would be consumed over the
whole time of speech (see McCornack et al., 2014). However,
lying should consume more cognitive effort per unit time
than truth-telling when other relevant conditions are equal—
such as the amount of speech, complexity of grammar, and
the difficulty in retrieving related information from memory—
because compared with truth-telling, lying involves an additional
cognitive process, namely the manipulation of the retrieved
information. Besides, deployment of a lie usually involves
awareness of the conflict between the expression and the
individual’s belief, which necessarily does not exist in truth-
telling. Of course, deployment of a truth (e.g., admitting an
extramarital relationship) could also involve other cognitive
processes (e.g., estimation of the negative outcomes and related
emotion reactions) that make truth-telling more effortful than
lying. Nevertheless, we can hypothesize that lying should
be more effortful than truth-telling if no other mental
process is involved (i.e., lack of consequences or emotional
reactions).
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a study
in which a group of participants responded to the same
interview questions twice. When responding to the questions
the first time, the participants encoded lies/truths, and
when they responded the second time, they retrieved the
previously-encoded lies/truths. We hypothesized that it should
be more cognitively effortful to encode than to retrieve
information, as previously suggested by other researchers
(see McCornack et al., 2014). Moreover, lying should be
more cognitively effortful than truth-telling in both encoding
and retrieving phases. A dual-task paradigm was employed
to measure the degree of cognitive effort throughout the
experiment.
Based on the premises that lying draws more on attention and
working memory than does truth-telling, and that a concurrent
task might interfere more with the former, dual-tasking was
applied in lie-detection; e.g., performing a concurrent math
task during the interview task (Patterson, 2009). However, the
findings were weak; and this is believed to be related to the
lack of theoretical rationale for the choice of the concurrent task
(Walczyk et al., 2013). Therefore, we designed a concurrent task
based on our definition of cognitive effort: cognitive resources
consumed per unit time.
Novel software “Follow Me” was developed to measure
the cognitive resources consumed per second in an eye-hand
coordination tracking task. We expected that the more cognitive
resources were consumed in a concurrent task (lying/truth-
telling), the fewer cognitive resources could be spent on the
“Follow Me” task. Its operation panel is shown in Figure 1. The
operator’s task was to operate the mouse pointer to track the
round red dot which is in the center of the operation panel at
the beginning of the task and moves in all possible directions
randomly at a stable speed after the task begins. Throughout
the task, “Follow Me” records the distance between the mouse
pointer tip and the dot center at a fixed frequency (1–1000Hz).
Eye-hand coordination is a universal human capability which
has been widely studied (e.g., Johansson et al., 2001), and can
even be found in the newborn (von Hofsten, 1982). The “Follow
Me” task is different from the majority of existing eye-hand
coordination tasks in that the movement trajectory of the target
was unpredictable. The obvious aim of tracking the dot is to
make the distance between the mouse pointer tip and the red
dot center as small as possible; thus, the average distance can
serve as an index of the operator’s overall performance. However,
distance fluctuation frequency is the real index of cognitive
effort spent upon tracking the dot per second. The distance
fluctuation frequency is the number of distance fluctuation cycles
per second. For example, if the distance increases from 5 to 10
pixels first, and then decreases to 0 pixels, and then increases
again to 5 pixels within every second, then the frequency of
the distance fluctuation would be 1Hz at any time. In reality,
this is not possible. The frequency changes over time and the
variant frequencies together form a frequency spectrum. Fourier
transformation was applied to analyze the dominant frequency,
the most prevalent frequency throughout the duration of a
truth/lie (see Welch, 1967).
Tracking the randomly-moving dot involves continuous
adjustment of hand-movement direction; frequency of the
adjustment determines the distance fluctuation frequency.
Therefore, the distance fluctuation frequency reflects cognitive
resources spent per second on the “Follow Me” task, which
is covert and sensitive. This measurement is consistent with
our definition of cognitive effort; that is, cognitive resources
consumed per unit time.
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FIGURE 1 | The“Follow Me” software operation panel.
Methods
Participants
One-hundred twenty-nine undergraduate students volunteered
to participate in our experiment. Eight participants did not follow
the experimenter’s instructions correctly. Therefore, the final data
were from 121 participants (56 male students, 18–25 years, Mean
age = 20.5 years, SD = 1.22 years). They all were native Chinese
and were financially rewarded 10 RMB for their participation.
Material
Within the “FollowMe” software the radius of the red dot is set as
10 pixels. The red dot was set to move at 20 steps per second, 25
pixels per step. The “Follow Me” software measured the distance
20 times per second (All of these parameters are adjustable in the
latest version of “Follow Me,” for the details, see Appendix 1).
A standard sheet of printed paper had 51 interview questions
on it: 17 questions not related to school life (responses to
these questions were not included in the following analyses)
and 17 pairs of questions related to undergraduate/graduate
school life, e.g., “What is the name of your instructor in your
undergraduate/graduate school?” We matched these questions to
control other factors related to the degree of cognitive effort in
responding (e.g., amount and complexity of answers). Moreover,
we tested whether a participant was really paying attention to
our questions: if a participant’s responses to a pair of questions
implicated the same information, her/his data were excluded. A
non-verbatim but synonymous answer was counted as the same
as the original answer. No subjective judgment was required,
because the answers were all concise. In this study, all of
the participants were attentive and gave different responses to
these matched questions (See the full list of the questions in
Appendix 2).
Procedure
The undergraduate participants were instructed to participate
in a pretest for a job interview, which was intended for
graduate students. The participants needed to pretend that they
were graduate students and thus fabricate lies when answering
questions related to “graduate school life.” The experimenter
explained that the deception was limited to this hypothetical job
interview and would not have any effect on real life. Personal
information obtained in this study was kept private. While
answering questions related to undergraduate school life, the
undergraduate participants were instructed to tell the truth.
The pretest included two phases. In each phase, an assistant
interviewed the participants with those 51 questions mentioned
above. The orders of the questions were pseudo-randomized in
both phases. After phase 1, the participants did a task unrelated
to our study (i.e., Solving Raven-Matrix problems) for 5min, and
then entered phase 2 of the job interview.
The participants were randomly allocated to one of the
following four groups: the Single-Single task group (N = 30),
in which the participants did not operate the “Follow Me”
task in any phase; the Dual-Single task group (N = 30), in
which the participants operated the “FollowMe” task continually
throughout phase 1; the Single-Dual task group (N = 30), in
which the participants operated the “FollowMe” task continually
throughout phase 2; the Dual-Dual task group (N = 31), in
which the participants operated the “FollowMe” task continually
throughout both phases.
The participants in the Dual-Single, the Single-Dual, and
the Dual-Dual task groups practiced the “Follow Me” task
before the job interview. During the practice, they responded
to some questions irrelevant to the hypothetical job interview.
In addition, the experimenter explained that the performance of
tracking the red dot was part of the interview and they should try
their best.
Data Analysis
Consistency in Responding to Job Interview
Questions
The participants responded to the same questions twice in phases
1 and 2. If their answers to a question in both phases implicated
the same information, then it was counted as an instance of
“consistency” in responding. The answers were all concise (e.g.,
names of people or places), and thus the experimenter alone
coded the number of instances of consistency, as shown in
Table 1.
Performance on the “Follow Me” Task
Throughout the interview, the computer screen and the
participants’ verbal responses were recorded by the computer
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TABLE 1 | Number of consistent responses in the interview.
Group Task type Truthful responses Deceptive responses
(sample size) M (SD) M (SD)
Single-Single (30) 12.53(0.63) 8.10(2.23)
Dual-Single (30) 11.27(1.48) 6.27(2.00)
Single-Dual (30) 11.80(1.47) 8.10(2.41)
Dual-Dual (31) 11.23(1.43) 6.00(2.48)
simultaneously. The recording was replayed afterward to
determine the time window of the participants’ responses in the
data collected by the “Follow Me” software. The time when the
assistant read the key word of the question (e.g., “instructor”
in the question: “What is the name of your instructor in
your undergraduate/graduate school years?”) was counted as
the beginning of a response because the participant began to
encode/retrieve truthful/deceitful information at that moment.
Termination of a response was counted as its end. Data from 19
participants were not included in the following analysis because
it was difficult to determine the time window of their responses
in the data collected by “Follow Me.” The final analyses included
25 participants in the Dual-Single task group, 21 participants
in the Single-Dual task group and 25 participants in the Dual-
Dual task group. (No participant in the Single-Single group was
included because no one in the Single-Single group had operated
the “Follow Me” software).
An example of the distance fluctuation during a response
is shown in Figure 2. The frequency spectrum of the distance
fluctuation was analyzed by Fast Fourier transformation. The
dominant frequency (with the largest amplitude) in the frequency
band between 0.8 and 4.4Hz (high pass: 0.8Hz, low pass: 4.4Hz)
was calculated for each response. (The maximum frequency
in the frequency spectrum is 10Hz.) This frequency band was
selected because it captured the frequency of the operator’s
adjusting the direction of mouse pointer movement. In addition,
maximum and mean distances were calculated during each
response.
Results
Consistency in Responding to Job Interview
Questions
In order to compare consistency in responding to different
conditions, a 2 (response type: truthful/deceptive)∗4 (task
conditions: the Dual-Dual, Dual-Single, Single-Dual, Single-
Single) ANOVA test was conducted on the degree of consistency.
The result revealed that response type (truth/lie) effect was
significant, F(1, 117) = 489.54, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.807. Group
effect was significant, F(3, 117) = 10.06, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.205;
however, the interaction between response type and group was
also significant, F(3,117) = 2.69, p = 0.049, η
2
= 0.065. In order
to explore the simple effect, ANOVA tests were conducted for
truthful and deceptive responses separately, and both revealed
significant group effects. For the truthful responses, F(3, 117) =
6.59, p < 0.001, Bonferroni Post-hoc tests revealed that there
FIGURE 2 | Fluctuation of the distance from the mouse pointer tip to
the dot center during a response.
were significant differences between the Single-Single and the
Dual-Single conditions, Cohen’s d = 1.13, p = 0.002; and
between the Single-Single and the Dual-Dual conditions, Cohen’s
d = 1.19, p = 0.001. For the deceptive responses, F(3, 117) =
7.53, p < 0.001, Bonferroni Post-hoc tests revealed that there
were significant differences between the Single-Single and the
Dual-Single conditions, Cohen’s d = 0.88, p = 0.014; between
the Single-Single and the Dual-Dual conditions, Cohen’s d =
0.90, p = 0.003; between the Dual-Single and the Single-Dual
conditions, Cohen’s d = −0.84, p = 0.014; and between the
Single-Dual and the Dual-Dual conditions, Cohen’s d = 0.87,
p = 0.003. Overall, participants in the Single-Single group were
more consistent than those in the Dual-Single and Dual-Dual
groups. Therefore, the “Follow Me” task affected consistency in
responding.
Paired sample t-tests were conducted for each group
separately. The results revealed that participants were more
consistent in truth-telling than in lying; all t > 2.74, all p < 0.01.
Therefore, the cognitive effort associated with lying appeared to
be higher than that of truth-telling.
Performance in the “Follow Me” Task
Averaged maximum distance, averaged mean distance, and
averaged dominant frequency are shown in Table 2. In order
to test our hypothesis about the behavior performance in the
“Follow Me” task, 2 (phase: first/second) ∗ 2 (response type:
truth/lie) repeated ANOVA analyses were performed respectively
on averaged maximum distance, averaged mean distance, and
averaged dominant frequency for the participants in the Dual-
Dual task group (only the Dual-Dual task group had operated
“Follow Me” in both phases). The effect for experimental phase
was only significant for dominant frequency, F(1, 23) = 41.02,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.64. Dominant frequency was significantly
lower in phase 1 than in phase 2. Response type effect was only
significant on dominant frequency, F(1, 23) = 27.10, p < 0.001,
η
2
= 0.54. Dominant frequency was significantly lower during
lying than during truth-telling. No interaction was significant, all
p > 0.05.
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TABLE 2 | Average distance, maximum distance, and dominant frequency
in each phase (Distance unit: pixel; frequency unit: Hz).
Phase\Index Average Maximum Dominant
distance distance frequency
Encoding truths 867.58(140.92) 4059.62(2706.67) 1.40(0.16)
Encoding lies 906.28(191.69) 4155.64(1546.39) 1.33(0.16)
Retrieving truths 830.57(120.85) 3231.99(1528.90) 1.52(0.17)
Retrieving lies 859.19(202.62) 3636.69(2543.24) 1.41(0.16)
Paired sample t-tests on averaged maximum distance,
averaged mean distance and averaged dominant frequency
in phase 1 revealed that the dominant frequency during
truthful responses was significantly higher than during deceptive
responses, t(49) = 5.63, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.75.
Other differences were not significant; all p > 0.05. Paired
sample t-tests on maximum distance, mean distance, and
dominant frequency in phase 2 also revealed that the dominant
frequency during truthful responses was significantly higher than
that during deceptive responses, t(44) = 5.39, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.79. Other differences were not significant, all
p > 0.05.
Discussion
Our results regarding participants’ consistency in responding
demonstrated that the “Follow Me” task was sufficiently
cognitively demanding so as to impair the participants’
performance in verbal responding. Specifically, participants
performing the “Follow Me” task (the Dual-Dual task group, the
Dual-Single task group) were less consistent in responding than
those not performing the “FollowMe” task (the Single-Single task
group).
Our hypothesis regarding the dominant frequency of distance
fluctuation was confirmed. Although no significant differences
in distance between the mouse pointer tip and the dot center
were found, the dominant frequency of distance fluctuation
during phase 1 (encoding) was significantly lower than that
during phase 2 (retrieving). Moreover, the dominant frequency
during lying was significantly lower than that during truth-
telling. Given that participants were instructed to follow the
moving dot as closely as possible, they probably paid attention
to the distance between the mouse pointer tip and the dot
center while failing to maintain the frequency of distance
fluctuation.
Some theorists have argued that the cognitive load associated
with lying will be lower when repeating a lie that previously
has been articulated, compared with the production of a lie for
the first time (see McCornack et al., 2014). Our results from
the “Follow Me” task supported this premise. Nevertheless, even
when repeating previously articulated responses, lying was still
more effortful than truth-telling. This result was different from
that in a previous study (see Hu et al., 2012). This may be
due to the differences in defining and measuring “cognitive
effort.”
Taken as a whole, these results confirm our hypothesis that
the production of bald-faced lies is more cognitively effortful than
that of truth, if no other mental processes are involved. Moreover,
the difference between lying and truth-telling was more likely to
exist in aspects of behavioral performance unnoticed by the liars,
compared with those obvious aspects of behavior performance.
It was easier for the participants to notice and control superficial
characteristics, such as distance, rather than to detect and control
latent patterns, such as frequency of distance fluctuation. This is
a common pattern of behavior performance during deception.
For example, when liars are controlling their facial expressions
which are superficial, the lower parts of their bodies, which are
less noticeable, often reveal their duplicity (for a review, see Bond
and DePaulo, 2006).
Our real-time lie-detection software “Follow Me” was
confirmed to be sensitive to cognitive load change. This
tool is a novel invention that could inspire lie-detection
practices and research fields in social cognition. It reminds
us that there are always some clues that liars may fail to
notice and manipulate because human cognitive resources are
limited. Therefore, real-time lie-detection through observing
multiple concurring behaviors may be valid in many different
circumstances, including job-interviews. Above all, “Follow Me”
can measure cognitive load with a high degree of temporal
precision. This advantage is especially vital for many research
questions for which existing technologies are not suitable. For
example, lie-detection in daily life should be real-time, because
partial inconsistency with facts is common in daily dialog: people
usually mix lies with truths. However, measurement based on
neural activity, such as fMRI, is not temporally precise enough
for measuring cognitive load in real-time.
It should be noted that the deception generated in this
study only involved bald-faced lies. Moreover, both the truth-
telling and the lying involved zero-consequence information. The
participants may not have had strong motivation for success in
lying, because they wouldn’t get or miss a real job because of their
performance in this hypothetical job-interview. On the other
hand, motivation is regarded as an important factor that affects
the cognitive resources consumed by lying (Verschuere and
Shalvi, 2014). Therefore, our findings may only be generalized
to a narrow band of deception, such as recreational lying.
Nevertheless, the “Follow Me” software could be applied to study
lying in many different contexts, to explore when lying would be
more involuntary and less cognitively effortful than truth-telling.
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Appendix 1
“Follow Me” Software is Free for the Public
“Follow Me” developed together by Chao Hu, Department of
Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of
Toronto, and Kun Huang, State key laboratory of precision
spectroscopy, East China Normal University, is free for the
public, downloadable from ResearchGate of Chao S. Hu. The
latest version of the software “Follow Me” has been developed by
adding functions such as: 1. recording input from keyboard and
mouse, so that the experimenter can mark the time windows of
an event during the experiment. 2. The red dot can be set to move
within a region whose boundary is invisible.
Appendix 2
The Full List of the Questions Used in This Study
A. Questions Related to Undergraduate/Graduate
School Life
1. Which restaurant do you usually go to in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
2. What is your student number when you are in graduate/
undergraduate school?
3. What is the name of the lake in your graduate/undergraduate
school campus?
4. Where does you best friend in your graduate/undergraduate
school come from?
5. What is the name of your instructor in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
6. Have you received any scholarships in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
7. What is the name of the student monitor in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
8. How many credits do you need for graduation in your
graduate/undergraduate school?
9. How many classmates do you have in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
10. Where do you live in your graduate/undergraduate
school?
11. What is the name of the dormitory monitor in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
12. Where is your graduate/undergraduate school?
13. How far is your home from your graduate/undergraduate
school?
14. What is the name of the student correspondent in your
graduate/undergraduate school?
15. What is your favorite food in your graduate/undergraduate
school?
16. How do you go back to your home from your graduate/
undergraduate school?
17. What is the price of your favorite food in your graduate/
undergraduate school?
C. Questions Related to Personal Information
1. When did you pass the level-4 English ability test?
2. What are your political beliefs?
3. Have you been a student monitor before?
4. What is your address?
5. What is your score of the Mandarin-level test?
6. What is the brand of your mobile phone?
7. Are you good at processing pictures on a computer?
8. What is your major?
9. Do you have any work experience?
10. How old are you?
11. What is your favorite sport?
12. What is your favorite song?
13. What is the name of your father?
14. What is your favorite tourist site?
15. Are you from the south of China?
16. What is your name?
17. What is your strength in your major?
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